The plan that funds the next four years also re-prices what you must prove.
On 30 June 2026 the Defence Investment Plan set out £298bn over four years. The money is real — but so is the bar that comes with it. Below: the nine dated changes already in the record, newest first, and the specific exposure each one puts on you. Not a forecast — what has already happened.
Nine dated changes. Each one puts something specific at risk.
A new memorandum commits both governments to secure the rare earths and processed minerals their defence industrial bases depend on. The dependency it names — magnets, refined materials — sits inside your bill of materials, not just in policy.
From 28 January 2026 the FCDO’s UK Sanctions List is the only authoritative list of designations; the OFSI consolidated list is no longer updated. A counterparty you cleared against the old list may not be clean against the one that now governs.
The Cyber Security Model v4 became mandatory for every DEFCON 658 contract. The obligation flows down from the prime through every sub-contracting tier; a lapsed assessment anywhere in that chain can stop work under the contract.
The October 2025 measure would require a licence wherever Chinese-origin heavy rare earths reach 0.1% or more of a part — even from a non-Chinese supplier — and refuses military end-use. Paused until 10 November 2026; the control can return, and the dependency never left.
The Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 names dependency on single or foreign-controlled sources — steel, energetics, semiconductors, rare earths — as a priority alongside price, backed by £1.5bn for an “always on” munitions pipeline and at least six new energetics factories. A concentration deep in your chain can now weigh against a prime, not just its cost.
The US Government Accountability Office found existing systems give “little insight into the vast majority of suppliers”; the Defense Business Board found defence chains run five to six tiers deep while visibility is lost beyond the second. The layer where the risk hides is, officially, dark.
The 2024–25 national-security investment report shows defence was 56% of screening notifications accepted or rejected, up from 48% a year earlier. A change of control over a supplier you rely on is more likely to be screened than not — and an ownership finding can feed straight into a procurement exclusion.
Allies committed to 5% of GDP by 2035 — 3.5% core plus a new 1.5% tranche for resilience and the industrial base. A decade of guaranteed demand, and a decade of new entrants chasing the lane you thought was yours.
A national-security debarment can be scoped to exactly the contract types you live on, and reaches connected owners, associated suppliers and sub-contractors. Someone else’s conduct can place a name on the central debarment list for up to five years — and lock you out with it.
Each of these maps to a defence decision you can put to us — settled against one published standard, delivered as an Evidence Pack. See the nine Evidence Packs →
Sources: gov.uk (Defence Investment Plan; UK–US Critical Minerals MOU; moving to a single UK Sanctions List; Cyber Security Model / ISN 2025/07; Defence Industrial Strategy 2025, CP 1388; Strategic Defence Review 2025 munitions; National Security and Investment Act Annual Report 2024–25; Procurement Act 2023 debarment), legislation.gov.uk (Procurement Act 2023 s.62 & Schedule 6), nato.int (Hague Summit Declaration), US GAO (GAO-25-107283) and the US Defense Business Board (Jan 2025), CSET (MOFCOM Announcement No. 61 of 2025, suspended 7 Nov 2025). Every dated figure traces to a primary or official record.